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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The fol lowing i s s u e s are put before t h i s Court: 
1) Was Respondent's appropriate remedy d i r e c t appeal 
to the d i s t r i c t court from the c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s f o r f e i t u r e rul ing 
and did the i r f a i l u r e to ra i se that appeal c o n s t i t u t e a waiver? 
2) Did the d i s t r i c t court act improperly and without 
authority by granting an extraordinary writ? 
3) Did the d i s t r i c t court lack c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
authority when i t exerc i sed supervisory authority over the Ninth 
Circui t Court? 
4) Does Judge Owens have the authority and d i s c r e t i o n 
to supervise bondsmen in the Ninth Circuit Court and was the 
revocation of Respondent's bonding p r i v i l e g e s proper? 
5) Did the d i s t r i c t court improperly interpret the 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-7 (1953, as amended) regarding 
the e f f e c t i v e term of bonds in the s t a t e of Utah? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents are bondsmen who petitioned the Fifth 
Judicial District Court, Washington County, for an extraordinary 
writ asking the District Court to exercise supervisory power over 
Appellants and claiming that the Ninth Circuit Court acted 
without authority in forfeiting certain bonds and revoking the 
bonding privileges of the bondsmen in that court. The District 
Court granted the writ and issued a summary judgment order 
holding that revocation of bonding privileges is prohibited 
without notice and hearing, and that imposition of sentence 
exonerates the liability of bail bondsmen by operation of law. 
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit Court objected to the District 
Court's ruling and filed this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Robert F. Owens (hereinafter "Judge Owens") 
presides as judge in the Ninth Circuit Court, Washington County 
(R. 107) . Respondents are bondsmen (hereinafter "bondsmen") who, 
prior to the initiation of this action in the Fifth District 
Court, Washington County, were qualified by Judge Owens to write 
bonds in the Ninth Circuit Court (R. 107). In January, 1984, 
Judge Owens and the bondsmen entered into an agreement whereby 
the bondsmen would be authorized to file undertakings of bail in 
the Ninth Circuit Court, Washington County, upon the condition 
that the bonds would continue after sentencing and throughout 
probation (R. 107) • The language of the individual bonds 
provides that the terms would continue through executionof 
sentence (R. 61, 107) . 
The bondsmen, pursuant to the agreement and 
authorization by Judge Owens, filed undertakings of bail in the 
Ninth Circuit Court in behalf of four criminal defendants: 
Samuel Benally, Geoffrey C. Greening, Jonathon S. Marshall, and 
Dennis B. Ashcroft (R. 19, 32-39). All four cases for which 
bonds were taken involve charges of driving under the influence 
of alcohol (R. 20, 22, 23, 62-63). In each case, the defendant 
in the Ninth Circuit Court failed to make himself subject to the 
Ninth Circuit Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of executing 
sentences imposed by that court in that they failed to abide by 
the terms of probation, failed to appear at the Washington County 
Jail, and/or failed to pay fines assessed as part of the circuit 
courtfs sentence (R. 20, 22, 63). Bond forfeiture hearings were 
held in the Ninth Circuit Court on May 6, 1985, and July 9, 1985, 
at which times the bondsmen requested exoneration of the 
undertakings (R. 24). Exoneration was denied by the Ninth 
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Circuit Court and the bonds were forfeited (R. 24) . The bondsmen 
did not appeal from the forfeiture hearings. 
On May 28, 1985, the bondsmen commenced an action in 
the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County, seeking an 
extraordinary writ and order requesting that the District Court 
exercise supervisory authority over the Ninth Circuit Court (R. 
1, 18, 27-28). The bondsmen further requested the District Court 
specify the duties and obligations of the bondsmen in the Ninth 
Circuit Court (R. 27-28). 
In a letter to the Washington County Sheriff dated May 
29, 1985, Judge Owens exercised his discretionary powers and 
authority over bondsmen in his court by rescinding authorization 
previously given to accept bailbonds from the bondsmen. Judge 
Owens withdrew the bondsmen's authority on the grounds that it 
was clear by the bondsmen's actions that they no longer intended 
to comply with the provisions of law, the specific language of 
each undertaking, and the agreement with the Ninth Circuit Court 
concerning the term of the bonds (R. 61, 107) . 
On September 22, 1985, Judge Burns, Fifth Judicial 
District Court, exercised supervisory authority over the Ninth 
Circuit Court by signing a summary judgment order (R. 118-19). 
This order provided (1) that revocation of the bondsmen's bonding 
privileges is prohibited unless afforded prior notice and 
hearing, and (2) that imposition of sentence relieves the 
obligation of the bondsmen and exonerates the undertaking of bail 
by operation of law (R. 118-119). The summary judgment was 
objected to by the Judge Owens in a pleading filed in the 
District Court on September 24, 1985 (R. 101-105). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Bondsmen's appropriate remedy was to appeal the Ninth 
Circuit Court's forfeiture rulings directly to the District Court 
and their failure to raise that appeal constitutes a waiver. The 
Ninth Circuit Court had jurisdiction over the bondsmen and the 
subject matter at the time the District Court improperly granted 
an extraordinary writ. The Ninth Circuit Court and Judge Owens 
acted well within proper jurisdiction and bondsmen had an 
appropriate remedy of direct appeal from the Ninth Circuit 
Court's forfeiture rulings to the District Court. Therefore, the 
District Court acted without jurisdiction in granting an 
extraordinary writ. 
Further, the District Court lacked constitutional 
authority when it exercised supervisory authority over the Ninth 
Circuit Court, thereby acting without requisite jurisdiction. 
Moreover, Judge Owens had authority and discretion to 
supervise bondsmen in his jurisdiction. Because of bondsmen's 
failure to comply with the terms of the undertakings and the 
agreement with the Ninth Circuit Court, Judge Owens properly 
exercised his discretion when he revoked bondsmen's privileges to 
file undertakings of bail in the Ninth Circuit Court. 
inally, the District Court's ruling that an undertaking 
of bail is exonerated when sentence is imposed is contradicted by 
the language of Utah Code Annotatede § 77-20-7 (1953, as amended) 
and of the bonds which requires liability to extend through 
execution of the sentence imposed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BONDSMEN'S APPROPRIATE REMEDY WAS TO APPEAL 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT'S FORFEITURE RULINGS 
DIRECTLY TO THE DISTRICT COURT AND THEIR 
FAILURE TO RAISE THAT APPEAL CONSTITUTES A 
WAIVER. 
Appeal procedures from the circuit court to the 
district court are provided for by law. The Utah Constitution 
grants the district courts appellate jurisdiction as provided by 
statute. The Utah Constitution, Article VIIIf § 5 (effective 
July 1, 1985) provides: 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited 
by this constitution or by statute, and power 
to issue all extraordinary writs. The 
district court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction as provided by statute. The 
jurisdiction of all other courts, both 
original and appellatef shall be provided by 
statute. Except for matters filed originally 
with the supreme court, there shall be in all 
cases an appeal of right from the court of 
original jurisdiction to a court with 
appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4, of the District Court Act (1953, as 
amended), grants appellate jurisdiction from inferior courts to 
the district court and § 78-3-5 provides for appeals to the 
district courts from final judgments of the circuit courts. 
An appeal lies from judgments from forfeited bonds 
obtained pursuant to the Bail Forfeiture Procedure Act, § 77-2a-
1, et. seq. (1983). There have been no reported decisions by 
this Court construing the provisions of that Act. However, an 
1884 Utah case held that appeal is not available from a bail 
forfeiture order. People v. Tremayne. 3 Utah 331, 3 P. 85 
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(1884). Although Tremayne has not been expressly overruled/ the 
holding is without merit in light of recent statutory revisions 
and many well-reasoned cases from other jurisdictions which allow 
appeals from bail forfeiture rulings. Cases with substantially 
similar provisions finding that orders dealing with the 
forfeiture of bail are appealable include: People v. Wilcox, 53 
Cal.2d 651, 2 Cal. Reptr. 754f 349 P.2d 522 (1960); Smaldon v. 
United States, 211 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1954); United States v. 
Cardina Casualty Ins, Co,, 236 F.2d 451 (7th Cir. 1956); State v. 
£Q££j&n, (La.r 1926) 172 La. 295, 110 So.480 (1926); State v. 
HtigJii, 51 Wash.2d 606
 f 320 P.2d 646 (1958); and State v. O'Day, 
36 Wash.2d 146, 216 P.2d 732 (1950). 
Moreover, this Court has entertained an appeal from a 
circuit court bail forfeiture order which had been appealed to 
the district court. Walton v. Circuit Court, No. 16281 (Utah 
1979) (See Appendix A). Appealability of a bond forfeiture order 
was not an issue, but the case was successfully appealed to the 
district court and the district court order was appealed to the 
Utah Supreme Court. This Court did not mention Tremayne in its 
decision. Consequently, bond forfeiture orders appear to be 
appealable in Utah, notwithstanding Tremayne. 
Bondsmen initiated the Petition for an Extraordinary 
Writ below before all of the forfeiture provisions in the Bond 
Forfeiture Procedure Act could be exhausted, therefore the 
Petition was untimely at best. The first bond forfeiture hearing 
was held on May 6, 1985, the Petition for Extraordinary Writ was 
initiated May 28, 1985, and the second bond forfeiture hearing 
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was scheduled for July 9, 1985. The bondsmen preemptively 
commenced the action below seeking relief from the Ninth Circuit 
Court1s actions even before the second bond hearing was scheduled 
and complained of an anticipated result prior to any action on 
the remaining two undertakings. The bondsmen have not appealed 
orders from either bond forfeiture hearing. Bondsmen should have 
availed themselves of the proper judicial remedies and procedures 
pursuant to the Bail Forfeiture Procedures Act and filed a timely 
appeal. A failure to do so constituted a waiver and does not 
warrant relief from the District Court in the form of an 
Extraordinary Writ. Anderson Y. Baker, 5 Utah 2d 33, 296 P.2d 
283 (1956). 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED IMPROPERLY AND 
WITHOUT AUTHORITY IN GRANTING BONDSMEN'S 
PETITION FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT. 
Pursuant to the Constitution of Utahf Article VIII § 5 
(effective July 1, 1985)f district courts have the power to issue 
all extraordinary writs. However, that power is limited to 
situations in which no other remedy is available and substantial 
injustice would otherwise occur. 
It is a well established principle that an 
extraordinary writ is not a proceeding for general review. 
Commercial Security Bank v. Phillips, 655 p.2d 678 (Utah, 1982); 
Anderson v> Bakerr 5 Utah 2d 33, 296 p.2d 283 (1956); Qlsen v. 
District Court, 106 Utah 220, 147 P.2d 471 (1944); Robinson v. 
City Court for City of Oqden, 112 Utah 36, 105 P.2d 256 (1947); 
Chesney v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 108 P.2d 514 
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(Utahf 1941). Rule 65B(a)r Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(hereinafter "URCP"), provides in pertinent partf "where no other 
plain, speedy, adequate remedy exists, relief may be obtained by 
appropriate action under these rules . . . ." [Emphasis added]. 
Pleadings seeking relief by way of extraordinary writ pursuant to 
Rule 65B, URCP, must specifically designate jurisdictional excess 
or abuse of discretion claimed and are subject to being dismissed 
if they merely set forth conclusions. Angell v. Sixth Judicial 
District Ct.r 656 P.2d 405 (Utah, 1982); Lee v. Provo City Civil 
Service Commission/ 582 p.2d 485 (Utah, 1978). 
This Court has held that if the lower court is 
proceeding without jurisdiction, but it appears that there is an 
adequate remedy, a writ should generally not issue. Allen v. 
Lindbeck. 97 Utah 471f 93 P.2d 920 (1939). Also if there is no 
want or excess of jurisdiction and an adequate remedy exists, a 
writ should never issue. Qlsen v. District Court/ Silvia. 
Furthermore, this Court has held that if there was an adequate 
remedy of appeal from a lower court that has jurisdiction over 
the parties and the subject matter, and the party permits it to 
lapse, he does so at his peril and an extraordinary writ should 
not lie. Anderson v. Baker, 5 Utah 2d 33, 296 P.2d 283 (1956). 
Applying the above principles to the instant case, if 
the Ningh Circuit Court has jurisdiction over bondsmen and the 
subject matter, and if appeal to the district court was an 
adequate remedy, the writ was improperly issued. Therefore, 
since the Ninth Circuit Court has jurisdiction over bondsmen and 
bond forfeitures, and an appeal from a bond forfeiture is 
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a v a i l a b l e , then an extraordinary writ should not l i e and the 
D i s t r i c t Court acted improperly and without authority in granting 
the bondsmen's extraordinary wr i t . 
POINT II I 
THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED CONSTITUTIONAL 
AUTHORITY WHEN IT EXERCISED SUPERVISORY 
AUTHORITY OVER THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT. 
The District Court apparently issued the extraordinary 
writ under what was perceived as supervisory authority over the 
Ninth Circuit Court. However, a recent amendment to the 
Constitution of Utah has removed all supervisory power district 
courts previously had over circuit courts. Article VIII, § 5 of 
the Constitution of Utah, effective July, 1985, states as 
follows: 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited 
by this constitution or by statute, and power 
to issue all extraordinary writs. The 
district court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction as provided by statute. The 
jurisdiction of all other courts, both 
original and appellate, shall be provided by 
statute. Except for matters filed originally 
with the supreme court, there shall be in all 
cases an appeal of right from the court of 
original jurisdiction to a court with 
appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
The prior Constitutional provision, Article VIII, § 7, 
granting jurisdiction to the district court provided: 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in this Constitution, 
and not prohibited by law; appellate 
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and 
tribunals, and a supervisory control of the 
same.. The district courts or any judge 
thereof, shall have power to issue writs of 
habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo 
warranto, certiorari, prohibition and other 
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writs necessary to carry into effect their 
orders, judgments and decrees, and to give 
them a general control over inferior courts 
and tribunal is within their respective 
jurisdictions. [Emphasis added.] 
The former provision of the Constitution granted the 
district court supervisory control over inferior courts. The new 
Constitutional provision conspicuously omitts the language 
dealing with the district court's supervisory powers over 
inferior courts, i.e. circuit courts. When the new 
constitutional provision took effect, this provision specifically 
removed any prior supervisory authority the district court had 
over the circuit court under the repealed provisions. 
The District Court has no statutory authority to 
supervise circuit courts. Section 78-3-4 of the District Court 
Act, enacted in 1943 and amended in 1983, provides: 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in the Constitution 
and not prohibited by law; appellate 
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and 
tribunals, and a supervisory control of the 
Same.. The district courts, or any judges 
thereof, shall have power to issue writs of 
habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo 
warranto, certiorari, prohibition, and other 
writs necessary to carry into effect their 
orders, judgments and decrees, and to give 
them a general control over inferior courts 
and tribunals within their respective 
jurisdictions . • . . [Emphasis added.] 
This provision was enacted pursuant to the authority specified in 
Article VIII, § 7 of the prior Constitutional article and grants 
to the district court supervisory authority over inferior courts, 
in conformity with the prior constitutional provision. However, 
with the adoption of the new Judicial article, that portion of 
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§ 78-3-4 granting the district court supervisory authority over 
inferior courts is inconsistent with the new Article VIII, § 5. 
As a general principlef a statute existing at the 
adoption of a constitution or constitutional amendment cannot be 
upheld if it is opposed to the plain terms of the Constitution. 
In such a case, the statute may be regarded as repealed by the 
constitutional provision by implication. United States v. Mack, 
295 U.S. 480f 79 L.Ed. 1559, 55 S.Ct. 813 (1935); Massey v. 
United States, 291 U.S. 608, 78 L.Ed. 1019, 54 S.Ct. 532 (1934); 
United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 78 L.Ed. 763, 54 S.Ct. 
434 (1934); National Prohibition Caser 253 U.S. 350, 64 L.Ed. 
946, 40 s.ct. 486 (1920); Veterans1 Welfare Board v. Riley, 189 
Cal. 159, 208 P. 678 (1922); Jelm v. Jelm. 155 Ohio 226, 98 NE2d 
401 (1951). 
The final test in determining whether a statute is 
repealed by implication by a constitutional provision is: Does 
the Legislature have the present right to enact statutes 
substantially like the statute in question under the new 
constitutional provision? Monaghan v. Lewis, 5 Penn. 218, 59 A 
948 (Delaware 1905). In applying the test to the instant case, 
the Legislature had the right to enact a statute substantially 
like § 78-3-4, except for the supervisory language. The 
Legislature does not have the right to enact a statute which 
would grant to the district courts supervisory powers over 
inferior courts. Further, if the authority of the legislature to 
enact a particular statute is derived solely from a particular 
constitutional provision, a repeal of such provision operates as 
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a repeal of the statute. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 
287, 80 L.Ed. 233, 56 S.Ct. 223 (1935). United States v. 
Chambersf supra. The powers given the district court by 
constitutional provision cannot be enlarged or abridged by the 
legislature. Robinson v. Purand. 36 Utah 93, 104 P. 760 (1908). 
Therefore, a repeal of the constitutional provisions dealing with 
the district courts supervisory authority over inferior courts 
operates as a repeal of those provisions of § 78-3-4 granting 
supervisory powers of the district court over inferior courts. 
Section 4 of Senate Joint Resolution No. 1, Laws 1984 
(2d S.S.), providing for the repeal and reinactment of Article 
VIII, states in part: 
Existing statutes and rules on the effective 
date [July 1, 1985] of this amendment 
[Article VIII], not inconsistent with it, 
shall continue in force and effect until 
repealed or changed by statute. 
This savings clause inserted by the Legislature provides that all 
statutes in force and not inconsistent with the new 
constitutional provision shall continue until amended or repealed 
by the Legislature. However, by this enactment, the Legislature 
recognized that inconsistent statutes cannot continue in force 
and are therefore repealed by implication. Therefore, those 
provisions of § 78-3-4 granting such supervisory powers to the 
district court cannot be saved and are of no effect. 
In the case before the Court, the District Ccourt acted 
without constitutional authority when it attempted to exercise 
such supervisory powers over Appellants. The district court is 
limited to those powers granted it by the Constitution. S.L.C. 
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v, Christensen Co. . 34 Utah 38f 95 P. 523 (1939); WadSWQrth V» 
Santaquln City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 (1933); National Tunnel 
& Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission, 99 Utah 39, 102 P.2d 508 
(1940). Consequently, the district court improperly exercised 
supervisory power over the circuit court. 
POINT IV 
JUDGE OWENS HAS AUTHORITY AND DISCRETION TO 
SUPERVISE BONDSMEN IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT 
AND THE REVOCATION OF BONDSMEN'S BONDING 
PRIVILEGES WAS PROPER. 
By constitutional grant of authority in Article VIII, 
§ 5, Constitution of Utah, the Legislature enacted the Circuit 
Court Act of 1977, Utah Code Ann., § 78-4-1 et. seq. (1953, as 
amended), and created a circuit court system. The purposes of 
the Circuit Court Act are enumerated in § 78-4-2, as follows: 
The purpose of this act is to create a 
statewide court of record of limited 
jurisdiction to provide full-time 
professional judicial service to every county 
in the state on a regular basis organized and 
administered in like manner to the district 
courts of the state. To this end this act 
shall be liberally construed and applied* 
[Emphasis added.] 
The circuit courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, 
but § 78-4-18 provides that circuit judges have the same powers 
with respect to matters within their jurisdiction as may be 
exercised by district court judges. The circuit courts are 
supervised by the Supreme Court and the Judicial Council, as are 
all Utah courts. Article VIII, §§ 4 and 12, Constitution of Utah 
(effective July 1, 1985). 
The Legislature has granted to circuit court judges the 
jurisdiction and powers of a magistrate, including the release on 
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bail of persons charged with criminal offenses. Section 77-20-5. 
Further, section 77-20-4 provides that bail may be posted in cash 
or a written undertaking with or without sureties,subject to the 
discretion of the magistrate. It is in the exercising of such 
discretion that a magistrate has the authority to determine from 
whom and under what minimal conditions a written undertaking, or 
bond, can be accepted. In addition, minimal qualifications of 
sureties on written undertakings are specified as follows in § 
77-20-5: 
Qualifications of sureties—Justifi-
cation—Requirements of undertaking. (1) 
The sureties on written undertakings shall be 
real or personal property holders within the 
state and shall collectively have a net worth 
of at least twice the amount of the 
undertaking, exclusive of property exempt 
from execution. 
(2) Each surety shall justify by 
affidavit upon the undertaking and each may 
be further examined upon oath by the 
magistrate or by the prosecuting attorney in 
the presence of a magistrate, in respect to 
his property and net worth. 
(3) The undertaking shall, in addition 
to other requirements, provide that each 
surety submits himself to the jurisdiction of 
the court and irrevocably appoints the clerk 
of the court as his agent upon whom any 
papers affecting his liability on the under-
taking may be served, and that his liability 
may be enforced on motion and upon such 
notice as the court may require without the 
necessity of an independent action. 
No other procedure for the approval of bondsmen is 
specified by the Utah Legislature. The Legislature has granted 
circuit court judges, when acting as magistrates, broad 
discretionary powers over sureties to written undertakings. The 
entire field of the regulation of bondsmen has not been preempted 
by legislative action. This Court has imposed no additional 
standards. 
-14-
Furtherf curcuit courts have certain common law 
inherent judicial powers in addition to those specifically 
prescribed by the Legislature. As a common law inherent judicial 
power, courts have the authority to authorize and control 
bondsmen in their jurisdiction. Taylor v. Waddy, (Tenn., 1960) 
334 SW2d 733. The Supreme Court of Tennessee in Taylor v. 
Waddey, in construing the Release from Custody and Bail Reform 
Act, T.C.A., § 40-12-1 et. seq., held that statutes concerning 
the regulation of bail bondsmen and their qualifications are 
directory only and do not cover the whole field of what is 
necessary for a bondsmen before he is allowed to make bonds in 
various cases and that such statutes do not take away inherent 
right of the court to peroperly administer its affairs. The 
Court reasoned that a court with general judicial powers has 
certain inherent judicial powers and rights to see that the 
courts over which they preside, in the absence of any statute on 
the subject, are conducted in an honest and upright manner by 
those who are officers of the court or who are dealing with the 
court. 334 S.W.2d 733, 736. 
The releveant Tennessee statute is an extensive 
statutory system for dealing with bail and bondsmen based on 
public policy considerations aimed at controlling certain 
questionable practices. In Utah, the bonding statutes are 
directory only and do not cover the entire field of regulation of 
bondsmen, particularly in light of the limited control the 
Legislature has exercised over the courts in this area. The 
statutes do not interfere with judge1s inherent powers such as 
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the administration of court affairs, which includes the approval 
and revocation of bonding authority. 
The acceptance and approval of bonds is a judicial 
function of the court. Summit Fidelity & Surety Co. v. Nimitz. 
158 Neb. 762, 64 N.W.2d 803 (1954) Authority to authorize, 
supervise, and control bondsmen lies with the magistrate having 
jurisdiction over the person arrested. Furthermore, there are no 
Utah cases which grant that supervisory authority to anyone other 
than the magistrate and no Utah cases have held that bondsmen are 
granted a license to write bonds. 
In the instant case, the bondsmen were granted the 
privilege to issue ritten undertakings in the Ninth Circuit 
Court. Judge Owens has the authority and discretion, pursuant to 
§§ 77-20-4, 77-20-5, and common law inherent judicial powers, to 
authorize and control bondsmen. That privilege to issue bonds 
continues at the discretion of the court. There is no authority 
in Utah for the suggestion that the privilege, once granted by a 
magistrate, continues indefinitely. The bondsmen have in no way 
been granted a life estate to write bonds in the Ninth Circuit 
Court. The discretion is with the magistrate, Judge Owens, as to 
how long that privilege may continue and that discretion may be 
exercised on a case by case basis. Sections 77-20-4 and 77-20-5. 
Further, if the surety company should conduct his 
business in a manner as to lose the confidence of the court or a 
judge thereof, the court or judge by exercising the court1s 
inherent powers could refuse to accept bonds of any named surety. 
Concord Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States. 69 F.2d 78, 81 
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(2nd Cir. 1934). The court's judicial act of approval of a bond 
is not mandatory under § 77-20-4, supra, but the statute calls 
for the exercise of judicial discretion. 
A general rule exists that when judicial discretion is 
appropriate, considerable weight should be given to the 
determination of the trial court. Barber v. Calderf 522 P.2d 
700, 702 (Utah 1974). This is true because the trial judge is in 
the best position to determine what the interests of justice 
require in safeguarding the rights and interests of all parties 
concerned due to his close involvement with the parties, the 
witnesses, and the total circumstances of the case. id. 
In the context of regulating bail bondsmen in his 
court, Judge Owens is in the best position to determine what 
justice requires in safeguarding the interests of the accused, 
the court, and the bondsmen. Therefore, great deference should 
be given each judge in regulating bondsmen at the circuit court 
level. £££ jaLSQr Gilbreath v. Ferguson/ where the Tennessee 
Supreme Court stated, "Of course, the judge has full authority to 
determine who shall and who shall not qualify as bondsmen in his 
own court." 260 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tenn. 1953). 
Moreover, the bondsmen have no recognized property 
right to act as bondsmen before the Ninth Circuit Court. When 
bondsmen's privilege to issue bonds was revoked because Judge 
Owens no longer had confidence that the underwritings secured by 
bondsmen would continue in execution of sentence as provided in 
S 77-20-7 and the specific terms of the individual undertakings, 
the bondsmen were deprived of no recognized property right in 
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Utah, Judge Owens properly exercised his discretionary, inherent 
authority to authorize or not authorize a bondsman pursuant to 
current law. The privilege to act as bondsman in the Ninth 
Circuit Court is conditioned upon the understanding that the term 
of each bond would continue in execution of any sentence. 
Section 77-20-7. As long as the bondsmen are willing to comply 
with the terms of the agreement, the provisions of the statute, 
and the specific language of the written undertakings, and are 
qualified to act as bondsmen pursuant to law, there would have 
been no action taken by Judge Owens to alter the privilege which 
had been granted them to issue bonds in the Ninth Circuit Court. 
In jurisdictions where a license has been granted by an 
administrative body to act as bondsmen, revocation of that 
license without notice and hearing would probably violate due 
process of law. However, in Utah, no license is granted to 
bondsmen, bondsmen are not controlled in any way by any 
administrative agency or body, and the authority to accept 
sureties on written undertakings is within the sole discretion of 
a magistrate. Sections 58-1-11 through -20. Therefore, the due 
process argument is without merit. 
In other jurisdictions courts have recognized a due 
process right to notice and hearing prior to revocation of a bail 
bondsmen's license. J3L££, i.e. In Re Carter. 192 F.2d 15 (D.C. 
Cir. 1951); Weaver v. Dostertr 300 s.E.2d 102 (w.va. 1983). 
However, the circumstances of these cases differ significantly 
from the instant case. Carter dealt with congressional 
legislation which removed part of inherent authority of the D.C. 
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district courts to regulate bondsmen in their jurisdiction. The 
legislation granted bondsmen in D.C. courts licenses, a property 
right, for a limited term. Weaver involved a statute, W.Va. Code 
S 51-10-8 (1959), which was substantially similar to D.C. Code § 
23-602 cited in Carter, The Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia found that authority to act as a bondsmen sufficiently 
resembles a license and therefore must be treated as a license 
for purposes of procedural requirement attendant upon its 
termination. 300 S.E.2d at 103. Once finding that bondsmen are 
granted a license, the Weaver court followed Carter without 
discussion. Moreover, Weaver has not been followed in any other 
jurisdiction. 
Significantly, there is no grant of a license and no 
grant of a property right to bondsmen in Utah. At most bondsmen 
have a privilege to issue undertakings and the magistrate has the 
discretion to accept bonds issued by bondsmen. Bondsmen are not 
authorized to issue bonds for any specific period of time. The 
period of time a bondsmen may issue bonds may be on a case by 
case approval of undertakings by a magistrate. The Legislature 
has not taken the Utah courts their common law authority to 
regulate bondsmen in their jurisdiction. Section 77-20-5 has 
merely specified minimal qualifications requirements for 
sureties. The Legislature, in its wisdom has determined that 
magistrates shall continue to have and to exercise broad 
discretionary powers in this area. It can be presumed that if 
the Legislature intended that bondsmen be licensed, they would 
have enacted appropriate licensing provisions. 
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A strong dissent to the majority opinion in Carter was 
written by Judge Prettymannf in which Judge's Stephens and 
Proctor joined. 192 F.2d 15, 17-29. The minority argued 
pursuasively that the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has no 
jurisdiction to review orders of the U.S. District Court upon 
original applications for authority to write bonds or upon 
applications for renewal, except where there is an abuse of 
discretion by the Court below. The dissent argues that Congress 
left to the trial courts the making of rules under statutef that 
the authority to accept a bondsmen is within the discretion of 
the trial courts, and that that authority must not be disturbed 
unless there is found an abuse of that discretion. 192 F.2d 15f 
17-29. 
Judge Prettyman argues that the writing of bail bonds 
is not a right and that the customary elements of due process of 
law are not required for valid denial of the privilege and states 
as follows: 
The writing of bail bonds for pay is not 
an ordinary vocation the right to pursue 
which is a basic right and as to which the 
police power of the state is sharply limited. 
In the first placer the admission to bail is 
part of the operation of the trial courts. 
It is the placing of an accused in the 
custody of persons selected by him who 
become, so to speak, his friendly jailers. 
It is the substitution of one custodian for 
another. The surety upon the bail has power 
to arrest the accused. The granting of bail 
is governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. It is performed by a 
commissioner, judge or justice. Thus going 
bail is not an ordinary and independent 
vocation but is an integral part of the 
operation of the judicial system. In the 
second placer the bail bond is a contract 
with the Government, According to the 
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doctrine of Perkins Vt kukens Steel Co«, no 
person has a "right" to do business with the 
Government by contract. That doctrine is 
peculiarly applicable to bail contracts, 
because, from the very nature of the 
transaction, the qualification of a surety to 
appear upon even one bond is in large measure 
within judicial discretion* 
192 F.2d 15, 18-19. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Judge Prettyman concluded: 
All the foregoing characteristics of 
bail bonds combine to indicate that there is 
no basic "right" to enter into thenu as 
suretyr with the Government Due process of 
law applies to a deprivation onlyt If a 
person is not engaged in a business and has 
no enforceable right to enter upon it. he is 
not deprived of a right if he is denied the 
privilege> Since there is no right to write 
bail bonds for pay, my view is that the 
customary elements of due process of law are 
not required for valid denial of the 
privilege* 
192 F.2d 15, 19. 
[Emphasis added.1 
The Tennessee Supreme Court in Taylor Vt Waddey, supra, 
analyzed the Carter decision and refused to go as far as the 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. The Taylor court adopted Judge 
Prettyman1s argument from the dissent and determined that the 
courts have inherent powers above and beyond the directions 
provided in the bail statutes. 334 SW2d 733, 737. Taylor also 
stated that so long as the bondsman complies with the statutes 
and meets a fair and rasonable standard in the conduct of his 
business before the courts then there is no one who is going to 
prevent him from practicing his profession therein. Under those 
circumstances there is no violation of the due process of the law 
because due process applies only to a deprivation. 334 SW2d 733, 
737. Therefore, the notice and hearing which it is insisted 
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Judge Owens allegedly failed to provide for could in any event be 
only such notice and hearing as would afford due process when it 
is contemplated that some constitutional right is claimed to be 
invaded. 
In this case there is no deprivation of due process. 
For there to have been a violation of due process, there must 
have been a deprivation of a property right. The bondsmen have 
no property right to issue bonds in the Ninth Circuit Court. 
Bondsmen have no license to act as bondsmen. The term of the 
underwritings to be issued by bonds in the Ninth Circuit Court 
was provided for by law, by terms of the bond, and by agreement 
and was a condition upon which the privilege to write bonds was 
predicated. Bondsmen, by their own actions clearly indicated 
that they no longer intended to be bound by the terms of the 
agreement, the terms of the bonding statute, and the specific 
terms of the written undertakings, thereby rendering themselves 
unsuitable to issue bonds in the Ninth Circuit Court. The 
bondsmen were afforded notice and hearing at the forfeiture 
hearings for the bonds which were forfeited in the circuit court, 
both before and after this action was commenced. The issue as to 
the term of undertakings should have been raised below and an 
appeal taken therefrom. 
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POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY INTERPRETED 
UTAH CODE ANN §§ 77-20-7 AND 77-20-8 WITH 
RESPECT TO THE EFFECTIVE TERM OF THE 
UNDERTAKING OF BAIL AND THE LIABILITY OF 
BONDSMEN. 
The term of the undertaking of bail and the liability 
of bondsmen continue up to and including the surrender of the 
defendant in execution of any sentence imposed. The District 
Court erroneously ruled that the undertakings of bail were 
exonerated by operation of law upon the imposition of sentence by 
the Ninth Circuit Court and that the bondsmen were accordingly 
released from liability. However, this ruling misinterprets the 
language of § 77-20-7(1) (1980) which provides: 
The principal and the sureties on the 
written undertaking are liable thereon during 
all proceedings and for all appearances 
required of the defendant up to and including 
the surrender of the defendant in execution 
of any sentence imposed irrespective of any 
contrary provision in the undertaking. 
[Emphasis added]. 
Section 77-20-8 further provides in pertinent part: 
Upon conviction, by plea or trial, the court 
may order a defendant to be taken into 
custody or may order bail continued pending 
imposition of sentence« 
[Emphasis added]. 
Standing alone, § 77-20-8 may be read to support the 
District Court1s ruling. However, when read in conjunction with 
§ 77-20-7, the District Court improperly interpreted the intent 
of the statutes. Furthermore, it is necessary to consider that 
the primary purpose of bail is to ensure the appearance of the 
defendant at all proceedings required by the court, "up to and 
including the surrender of the defendant in execution of any 
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sentence imposed," Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-7 (1980) (emphasis 
added). Also, the specific language of the bonds provides the 
same term of the statute. 
In Walton v. Circuit Courtr No. 16281 (December 12f 
1979), this Court held that when defendants were ordered to pay a 
fine, but no jail sentence was imposed, their bondsman was 
released from liability. Appendix A. The Court reasoned that 
the defendants were no longer subject to detention on the charges 
and judgments against them and that the purpose for the bail 
bonds had been fulfilled. In the present caser a jail sentence 
was imposed upon each defendant in addition to a fine and other 
conditions of probation. Therefore, the defendants remained 
subject to detention on the charges and the purpose for the bail 
bonds had not been fulfilled. Consequently, the circuit court 
properly refused to exonerate the bonds. 
Significantly, the Legislature recognized the 
difference between imposition of a sentence and execution of a 
sentence. Section 77-20-7(i) provides that sureties are liable 
for a term up to and including the "execution of any sentence 
imposed," [Emphasis added]. Other courts have recognized this 
distinction. Gibson v. State, 655 P.2d 1028 (Okla. 1982); 
Kriebel v. United States, 10 F.2d 762 (7th Cir. 1926). In 
Gibson, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma refused to exonerate a bond 
when the defendant failed to render himself in execution of 
judgment after sentencing. 655 P.2d at 1030. The court in 
Kribel defined "imposition of sentence" as the laying on of 
sentence or the act of sentencing and "execution" as the act or 
-24-
process of carrying out in accordance with a plan, purpose or 
order. 10 F.2d at 764. 
Moreoverf the general rule is that a bond entered into 
voluntarily and for a lawful consideration is valid as a 
contractual obligation if it is not contrary to public policy. 
Bendrick v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 154 Kan. 79, 114 
P.2d 812#(1941); Day v. Walton, 199 Tenn. 10, 281 S.W.2d 685 
(1955) . 
In the instant case, the bondsmen entered into an 
agreement, not inconsistent with law, with Judge Owens to write 
bonds in that court subject to the understanding that term of the 
undertakings would continue through probation. The language of 
the statute is entirely consistent with such an agreement. 
Therefore, because the bondsmen entered into this relationship 
voluntarily and the agreement does not violate public policy they 
are bound by their agreement. 
For all of the above reasons, this Court should reverse 
the district court's ruling releasing the bondsmen from liability 
and find that bail bonds are exonerated at the completion of 
probation. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the above reasons, Appellants respectfully 
request that the Court find that pursuant to Utah law, practice 
and procedure, that Judge Owens has the authority and discretion 
to supervise bondsmen in the Ninth Circuit Court and that he 
acted properly therein. Furthermore, that the bondsmen had an 
appropriate remedy for direct appeal to the district court and 
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failure to raise that appeal constituted a waiver. Finally, that 
the district court improperly and without authority issued an 
extraordinary writ. Therefore, the district court's ruling 
should be reversed. 
DATED this /? day of April, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DIANE W. WILKINS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and exact copies of the 
foregoing Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to Gary W. 
Pendleton, Attorney for Respondent, 50 East 100 South, Suite 101, 
St. George, Utah 84770, this ^ day of April, 1985. 
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APPENDIX 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
— — 0 0 O 0 0 - — ~ 
Vincent P. Walton, et al., 
Plaintiff6 and Respondents9 
Circuit Court, State of Utah, 
Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City 
Department, and the Honorable 
Maurice D. Jones9 Circuit Judge, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendants appeal from an adverse summary judgment 
ordering the exoneration of the undertakings of the bail bonds 
of four defendants in cases filed in the Salt Lake City Court, 
sow the Circuit Court. Each of the four defendants had been 
charged in the Salt Lake City Court with a misdemeanor and had 
been admitted to bail on undertakings complying with the re-
quirements of Section 77-43-13, U.C.A. 1953, furnished by the 
plaintiff. In the course of the proceedings, each defendant 
had been convicted or had entered a guilty plea, and had 
personally appeared in court and been sentenced to pay a fine 
of $150.00. Some records pertaining to the cases have been 
lost. However, the documents available Indicate that the 
sentence was to pay a fine and they do not show that any jail 
sentence had been imposed as a part of any sentence, nor to 
enforce payment of any fine. The court gave each defendant 
30 days to pay the fine, which period expired without payment. 
Proceedings were instituted against the bondsman on the theory 
that the undertaking in the bail bonds required the bondsman 
to pay any fine Imposed if the defendants failed to pay as 
ordered. All four bonds were ordered to be forfeited. The 
bondsman sought relief in the District Court, and obtained a 
Judgment ordering, among other things, that the Circuit Court 
exonerate the undertakings in bail and release the bondsman 
from liability. 
The liability of the bondsman is determined by the 
terms of the suretyship undertaking. There is no express 
requirement in the language of the undertaking that Imposes 
liability on the bondsman for payment of any fine. There is 
a statement "that the defendant will render himself In execu-
tion of the Judgment.*1 This statement presupposes that the 
Judgment is one that provides for Imprisonment or for imprison-
ment to enforce payment of a fine. A Judgment limited to a 
fine constitutes a lien, upon which an execution may be Issued 
as on a Judgment in a civil action. 
No. 16281 
F I L E D 
December 12, 1979 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
In the words of Justice Cordoza: "In the discretion 
of the court the judgment may direct that the defendant shall 
be~Imprisoned until the fine is paid. If the direction for 
Imprisonment is omitted, the remedy by execution is exclusive. 
Imprisonment does not follow automatically upon a showing of 
default in payment. It follows, if at all, because the con-
sequence has been prescribed in the imposition of jtfee sentence. 
The choice of pains and penalties, when choice is committed 
to the discretion of the court, is part of the judicial func-
tion. This being so, it must have expression in the sentence, 
and the sentence is the judgment.91 Rill v. United States, 
298 U.S. 460, 80 L. Ed. 1283, 56 8. Ct. 760. 
When fines only were imposed against the four de-
fendants, they could no longer be subjected to any detention 
on the charges and judgments against then. The purpose for the 
bail bonds had been fulfilled, and their bondsman was released 
from any further liability. 
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. No 
costs awarded. 
Wilkins, Justice, does not participate herein. 
No. 16281 •2-
